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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
After the collapse of the Argentine currency board in late 2001, capital flows to Latin America 
dried up; and, in Brazil, country risk rose to over 20 percent in summer of 2002. Following a 
substantial reduction in its external debt over the preceding four years, Brazil’s public debt had 
appeared to be sustainable. Why, then, should it suffer the same borrowing costs as pre-default 
Argentina?  
 
Some economists believe that the sudden increase in the sovereign spreads in Brazil might be 
caused by the regional contagion, which triggered a shift of equilibrium in a multiple equilibria 
context. But this cannot adequately explain why Brazilian spreads went up in line with Lula’s 
popularity. We argue instead that the contagion may operate through domestic politics in Brazil. 
We suggest that there was ‘guilt by association’ as  the preceding December 2001 default by the 
Left-wing party in Argentina on its sovereign debt obligations damaged the reputation of the 
Left-wing party in Brazil, triggering exaggerated bond spreads before Lula’s election. 
 
As Favero and Giavazzi (2002) have noted, the pre-election term structure of risk spreads 
showed a marked increase not at but after the election, specifically in 2003 after Lula was 
expected to take office. In actual fact, sovereign spreads have fallen steadily since the election. It 
is as if the markets have been willing to revise their extreme views in the light of the observed 
behaviour of the incoming administration the appointments it has made and the commitments it 
has undertaken with the IMF, for example. In the paper, we use a model of Bayesian learning to 
show how avoiding default itself could lead to the restoration of confidence and a fall in post-
election sovereign spreads.  
 
Sovereign Spreads and Political Risk 
 
Technically, the influence of political factors on sovereign spreads can be analysed by 
emphasising differences of preference between the political parties competing for power. 
Assume, as a polar example, that the Right-wing is always expected to honour its debts, while 
the opposing Left-wing is always expected to default. Then, in the run up to the election, 
creditors can use the ex-ante probability of each party being elected to form the expected rate of 
default -- with the outcome of the election determining whether or not default actually takes 
place. 
 
Consequently, with a Right-wing party in power but an election looming, sovereign spreads will 
tend to move in line with opinion polls, as in Brazil in 2002 where spreads increased as Mr. da 
Silva’s popularity soared. As the polls swung in favour of Mr. da Silva, sovereign spreads 
increased sharply: from around 7 percent in March 2002, to around 20 percent in September, as 
Lula moved from under 30 percent to over 40 percent in the public opinion polls.  
 
 
That the Left-wing party automatically repudiates its debts is an extreme assumption. 
Nevertheless, it may capture panic in financial markets, when there are exaggerated fears of an 
untried Left-wing candidate. The idea that contagion might involve jumps between multiple 
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equilibria has been proposed by Masson (1999)1; but the political-economy approach provides an 
alternative channel for contagion.  Where can the market get a fix on what a new untried 
government in Brazil might do? Why not look at what happened in Argentina, where the 
departure of President de la Rua led to debt repudiation? 
 
Learning 
 
In the months following the election of Mr. da Silva as President, sovereign spreads on the 
country’s bonds declined from a peak of 23 percent in the Fall of 2003 to around 13 percent in 
January and 11 percent in March 2003. They must fall further if Brazil is to be able to honour its 
debts in the medium term; but there is evidence that markets are getting over their initial panic at 
the prospect of a Left-wing administration. 
 
To account for this decline in sovereign spreads after the election, we appeal to a model of 
learning.  If markets initially expect default with high probability, but revise this down if no 
default takes place, sovereign spreads will continually subside much as has been observed.  
 
Learning and Contagion  
 
The learning model also contains channels for contagion effects. Where should market get its 
ideas of what a new government in Brazil might do? Why not look at what happened in 
Argentina before the Brazilian election, where the departure of Argentine President de la Rua led 
to debt repudiation? The events in Argentina could help set an initial high probability of default 
by the Left-wing government in Brazil as perceived by its creditors. 
 
The prediction of the political economy approach, together with learning, is that sovereign 
spreads will widen before the election as the chances of a Left-wing party taking power increase; 
they will increase momentarily as electoral uncertainty is resolved; but then they will decline 
over time as (conditional on observing no defaults) the markets learn to trust incoming 
government. 
 
Can the IMF counter contagion? 
Just as bad news from Argentina could increase sovereign spreads in a political-economy model, 
so arrangements with the IMF might have the opposite effect. By supplying emergency funds, 
the IMF could counter contagion: and, by signing an appropriate Letter of Declaration to 
implement sound fiscal policy and eschew default, an incoming Left-wing party might 
effectively reduce extreme views of its potential behaviour (so increasing the priors that the 
markets attach to the prospect that the Left-wing government is “strong” and/or reduce the per-
period probability that the Left-wing government defaults with high probability). Alternatively, 
such declarations might have the effect of significantly increasing the perceived lump-sum cost 
of default for the Left-wing government. This could lead to multiple equilibrium outcomes in the 
political-economy model. 
                                                 
1 For Masson, ‘pure contagion’ is defined as changes in expectations that are not related to changes in a country’s 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
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‘Learning to Forget’ 
 
Without learning, there is a considerable risk that market expectations will trigger a self-fulfilling 
default – the result of a “negative externality” from Argentina. Despite prior commitments to the 
IMF, any incoming government could be forced to default with spreads over 20 percent. With 
sufficiently rapid learning, however, this bad equilibrium may be avoided. In the paper, we 
assume that immediately after the election, the market begins to learn of Lula’s own policy 
preferences shaped by his new advises and commitment to the IMF. Conditional on no default, 
this process of “learning to forget” the Argentine example traces out a downward movement of 
sovereign spreads, (from an initial equilibrium in January with sovereign spreads around 13 
percent to the equilibrium in March with spreads around 11 percent.) The spreads are expected to 
subside further so long as the Left-wing administration is able to honour its debts. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
In the context where the behaviour of the potential Left-wing president is very uncertain, 
contagion may arise as markets and masses unthinkingly transpose events from neighbouring 
Argentina to Brazil. But, as models of learning suggest, prior probabilities of a radical 
repudiation will be revised over time if debts are honoured and repudiation resisted. The IMF can 
help offset the effect of contagion even before the election. Perceptions of radical repudiation 
may fade as candidates of all parties publicly promise to control fiscal deficits and abide by 
existing debt contracts and sign a Letter of Declaration to the IMF as a form of pre-commitment.  
 
To account for sovereign spreads after the election, we assume that market begins to forget the 
Argentine example and learns Lula’s true policy preferences. Conditional on no default, 
confidence could be restored with the further fall in post-election sovereign spreads.  
 
 
“Neither (of the two principal opposition candidates for the presidency) would be 
likely to choose a policy of deliberately reneging on Brazil’s debts. That being so, the 
recent market turbulence has to be interpreted as a panic.” Williamson (2002). 
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1. Introduction 
 
To the dismay of those who believed that, by now, emerging market lenders could ‘quarantine’ 
individual countries in crisis, the collapse of the Argentine currency board in late 2001 has been 
followed by a rise in Latin American sovereign spreads as capital flows to the region have come 
to a Sudden Stop, Calvo et al. (2002), Wolf (2003). As Figure 1 makes clear, however, Brazil - 
the dominant economy of the region, operating with a floating exchange rate, inflation targets 
and an internationally respected governor - suffered more than the average. Following a 
substantial reduction in its external debt during the past four years, Brazil’s public debt appears 
to be sustainable2 but interest rate pressures may nevertheless expose it to self-fulfilling crisis.3  
In the view of the ex-governor of the Central Bank and his deputy, the debt to GDP ratio will 
decline if real interest rates move toward single figures4; but if interest rates stay high - or growth 
falters - debt service could become an unsustainable burden, Fraga and Goldfajn (2002). 
 
Regional contagion is clearly one factor to be considered in explaining the high sovereign 
spreads for Brazil: but what appeared to ‘spook’ financial markets in the summer of 2002 was 
domestic politics, in particular the upcoming October election in which the Left-wing candidate 
was expected to do well.  In their analysis of the pre-election term structure of future rates, 
Favero and Giavazzi (2002) suggest that interest rates would rise when the Left-wing party takes 
office in January, and would rise further thereafter.  With Lula da Silva, the charismatic leader of 
the Left-wing Workers’ Party (PT), as the front-running candidate, markets feared a resort to 
unilateral debt restructuring to deal with the problems facing Brazil. Foreign banks carry 
substantial exposure to Brazil, so it is perhaps not surprising that, as the polls swung in his 
favour, sovereign spreads increased sharply: from around 7 percent in March, the country’s 
spread widened to around 20 percent in September, as Lula moved from less than 30 percent to 
over 40 percent in the public opinion polls, see Figures 1 and 2. 
                                                 
2 According to Sebastian Edwards,  Brazil’s debt ratio will decline as long as the primary surplus is maintained; see 
“ Brazil’s only hope of avoiding collapse,” The Financial Times, August 5, 2002 
 
3 Also refer to Goldstein (2003) for further details about debt sustainability, Brazil and the IMF. 
4 The current primary surplus of 3.75 per cent of gross domestic product guarantees a declining debt to GDP ratio as 
long as the inflation-adjusted interest rate paid by the government on its publicly traded debt does not exceed GDP 
growth by more than 7 percentage points. This is quoted from Fraga and Goldfajn (2002). 
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Figure 1: Sovereign Spreads for Brazil and Latin America (excluding Brazil and 
Argentina) 
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Source: Monthly average sovereign spreads obtained from JP Morgan and EMTA 
 
 
Figure 2: Opinion polls prior to the presidential election in October 6, 2002. 
 
 
Source: Financial Times, page10, Wednesday, October 2, 2002 
 
In the months following the election of Lula as president, however, sovereign spreads on the 
country’s bonds declined from a peak of 23 percent to around 13 percent by January 2003 and to 
11 percent by March 2003. They must fall further if Brazil is to be able to honour its debts in the 
medium term: but there is evidence that markets are getting over their initial panic at the prospect 
of a Left-wing administration.  
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We analyse these issues as follows. First, we outline a model where a “Sudden Stop” in capital 
flows leads to the prospect of default and debt restructuring in a discretionary equilibrium with 
high sovereign spreads. The approach follows that of Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) in their 
analysis of the Mexican crisis of 1994/5, except that the policy choice is the rate of default on 
debt rather than how fast debt is inflated away. Multiple equilibria emerge when there are lump-
sum costs of default, such as sanctions, litigation and other transaction costs (as in Rodrik and 
Velasco, 1999). Econometric studies of contagion in East Asian crisis have found evidence of 
jumps between regimes: could contagion from Argentina have shifted expectations enough to 
trigger a shift of equilibrium in Brazil?  
 
The macroeconomic implications of domestic politics in the run-up to an election are analysed in 
Section 3. Along the lines proposed by Alesina (1987), we distinguish between the political 
preferences of Right and Left (where the latter are more prone to default on debt) and calculate 
sovereign spreads endogenously, using election probabilities. To analyse events after the 
election, in Section 4, we appeal to a model of learning. Formally, market expectations are a 
weighted average of two rates of default (high, Hρ , and low, Lρ ), and the weights are revised by 
Bayesian updating. Where markets initially expect default with high probability, but revise this 
down if no default takes place, sovereign spreads will continue to subside much as has been 
observed. The Bayesian model also contains channels for contagion effects: events in Argentina 
could help determine the per-period probability for a weak Left-wing government to default, Hρ , 
and/or the initial Bayesian prior attached to this prospect.  
 
Could these contagion effects be mitigated through the good offices of the IMF? When a Left-
wing candidate signs a Letter of Declaration to implement sound fiscal policy and eschew 
default, could this not reduce the per-period probability for weak government to default, Hρ , 
and/or reduce the priors attached to this prospect? Could the IMF pre-commitment, alternatively, 
increase the perceived lump-sum cost of default for the Left-wing government? While the simple 
learning model we outline can be used to incorporate these features, it could surely be extended 
to allow for strategic behaviour on the part of the incoming government if, as The Economist 
(2003, pp. 39-40) suggests, Lula in Brazil, like New Labour in Britain, realises that managing 
market expectations is an important element of macroeconomic policy.  
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2. Sovereign Spreads with Multiple Equilibria 
 
Consider a small open economy with substantial government held debt in private hands, where 
inflation is checked by inflation targets operated by an independent Central Bank. To service the 
debt, the government can choose either to tax or to default – using involuntary debt restructuring 
to lengthen the term of the debt for example, or possibly to write it down. Where τ is the tax rate, 
and δ the default rate -- a measure of how costly the debt restructuring will be to creditors5-- the 
government minimises the following loss function: 
)}(CIy{min i
22
i δτλ δδ ++       (1) 
where y is a percentage deviation from full employment (natural rate), λ indicates the importance 
of welfare losses associated with output to the government. (Here, we index the parameters λ  
and C  by i , indicating different possible political parties.) In addition to welfare losses 
associated with output and taxes, we assume there are extra costs related to debt default, IδC(δ), 
where Iδ is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if there is a default and zero otherwise. The 
cost of default may reflect the direct sanctions imposed by the creditor countries, the temporary 
suspension of the borrowing country from the world capital markets, or other transaction costs 
associated with restructuring and repudiation. In particular, we specify the cost of default as 
2
iii Z)(C δαδ +=        (2) 
where both iZ  and iα  are positive. The costs imposed reflect ‘punishment’ for the act of default 
itself (breaking the terms of the debt contract) and for the degree of debt restructuring (value loss 
to creditors). 
 
Let all debts be short term (one period), the government would face the following budget 
constraint 
bRb e )1( δδτ +=++       (3) 
where b  is the quantity of debt as a fraction of GDP, R is the amount of debt that is rolled over, 
and eδ  is the expected default rate. We assume that, in normal circumstances, when R=b, the 
government raises taxes to pay the interest charges, and default is not really an option.  But what 
                                                 
5 A low value of δ could involve debt rollover, while a high level could indicate outright default. 
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if creditors panic and refuse to rollover6? In this case, when there is a Sudden Stop, to use 
Calvo’s phrase7, we set R = 0 and find that default and restructuring are real possibilities. (The 
latter could, for example, amount to imposing an involuntary rollover.) Given the Sudden Stop, 
we assume that creditors move first to determine the interest rate for debt contracts before the 
government chooses its policy. 
 
Actual default is beneficial to the government since it reduces taxes. But increase in default rate 
will increase expected default rate in the equilibrium. 
 
Given the foreign interest rate *r , we assume that the following interest parity condition holds 
for this small open economy 
e*rr δ+=         (4) 
where r  is the domestic interest rate. We assume, for simplicity, that there will be no expected 
depreciation or appreciation of the domestic currency: so sovereign spreads reflect the expected 
default rate. (We discuss implications of adding a risk premium later.) 
 
 Aggregate demand is simply given by 
ry −=  
where y  measure the percentage deviation from full employment level of output and for 
simplicity we ignore the effect of taxes on output . Normalising the foreign interest rate to zero, 
we arrive at 
ey δ−=         (5) 
 
The government’s decision is specified as a one period problem. The chronology in this single 
period is as follows: (1) after signalling a Sudden Stop, creditors form the expectation of the 
default rate and use it to determine the sovereign spread for the given borrowing, (2) conditional 
on this, the government decides whether to default. The set-up here clearly indicates that the 
government faces a time-consistency problem along the line of Sachs et al (1996) and Obstfeld 
(1996). 
                                                 
6 As in Mexico the signal is the failure of the government to place its debt in the current auction. 
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Minimising the loss function in (1), subject to the given expected default rate of eδ , gives rise to 
the following best response function for the government  
 τ
α
δ
α
δ
i
e
2
i
2 b)1(
b
b
=+
+
=       (6) 
Substituting (2), (5) and (6) into (1) yields minimum losses under given expected default rate 
 i
2e
i
2e
2
i
2
ieD Z)()1(
b
b)(L +++
+
= δλδ
α
αδ    (7) 
The rational expectations on the part of creditors imply 
δδ =e         (8) 
Therefore, we obtain the time consistent equilibrium as 



=
==
b
/b
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e
D
τ
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Figure 3: Time-consistent and pre-commitment equilibria  
 
Figure 3 illustrates graphically how this time consistent equilibrium is obtained. The horizontal 
and vertical axes indicate tax rate and actual default rate respectively. It can be seen from (1) that 
the absolute minimum (given )(C δ ) is at the origin. Part of an ellipse sketched in Figure 3 
indicates one iso-loss function. The budget constraint for 0e =δ  is given by a downward 
sloping line SS going through point b . Under this budget constraint, the government’s optimal 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 See Calvo et al (2002). 
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default rate would be at point C (which gives a strictly positive default rate). This clearly shows 
that, in the absence of lump sum costs of default government promises of no default are not 
credible. Varying eδ  traces all “short run” optimal choices made by the government on line OD, 
the government best response function described by (6). Substituting the rational expectations 
requirement (8) into (2) gives the best response function of the creditors’ (indicated by vertical 
line Db in the figure). The intersection between OD and bD gives the time-consistent (Nash) 
equilibrium at D. 
 
It is clear from the figure that with rational expectations on the part of creditors, equilibrium 
must satisfy the restriction that b=τ  after a Sudden Stop. (In normal times, however, the budget 
constraint would be much closer to the origin. Technically, with r* set to zero, it would be at the 
origin if R = 1; and one interpret the tax rate as the extra taxes needed to finance the Sudden 
Stop.) If the government can credibly pre-commit, the best outcome is where 



=
==
b
0
P
P
e
P
τ
δδ         (10) 
This is illustrated in Figure 1 by point b  and it is clear that the welfare losses to the government 
are less than that at point D. 
 
Suppose that the government can pre-commit to no default ( 0=δ ). The losses to the 
government when the default is nevertheless expected must be 
2e
i
22eeP )(b)1()(L δλδδ ++=      (11) 
 
What happens if the government can choose whether to commit or not? Pre-commitment is not 
always and everywhere preferable as it rules out the option of cheating. But as long 
as )(L)(L eDeP δδ ≤ , the pre-commitment equilibrium would be chosen. Define the critical level 
of expected default rate as 
)}(L)(L:{ eDePeec δδδδ ==  
or 
 13
1
b
Z)b(
2
i
2
ie
c −
+
=
αδ       (12) 
So, if ec
e δδ ≤  the pre-commitment (no-default) equilibrium will be chosen, otherwise, the time-
consistent (default) equilibrium will be chosen. Since eδ  is an endogenous variable, the 
conditions for selecting equilibrium are summarised below. 
 
Proposition 1 Equilibrium Separation 
(i) If )b/(bZ 2i
4
i +≤ α , the government would choose to default and the equilibrium is 
given by (9). 
(ii) If 2i
2
i
4
i /)b(bZ αα +≥ , the government would not choose default and the equilibrium 
is given by (10). 
(iii) If 2i
2
i
4
i
2
i
4 /)b(bZ)b/(b ααα +<<+ , both equilibria are possible. 
 
Proof: For default to be the equilibrium, we only require 0ec ≤δ ; and for no-default to be the 
only equilibrium, we require eD
e
c δδ ≥ . Rearranging in terms of iZ , we obtain the above 
conditions. 
 
It is clear from Proposition 1 that, when the fixed cost of default is low, the government would 
choose to default; if the cost is high it would choose not to; and the medium range of fixed costs 
generate multiple equilibria. This is very much in line with Obstfeld (1996) and Sachs et al 
(1996). 
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Figure 4: Endogenous choice of default: multiple equilibria 
 
The multiple equilibria case is drawn in Figure 4, where horizontal axis represents expected rate 
of default and the vertical the actual default rate. The 45-degree line OE indicates rational 
expectations. With moderate fixed cost of default, the critical level of the expected rate of 
default, ecδ , lies in between point O and D. To the right of ecδ , default would be chosen, so the 
effective government response function is given by BC; to the left of ecδ , no default would be 
chosen, so the effective government response function is given by OA. If creditors expect serious 
default, the cost for government not to default is high, so it chooses to default. If little or no 
default is expected the government is better off honouring its debts. This makes the selection of 
equilibrium entirely depend on creditors expectations, which may depend on the realisation of 
“sun spots” – or on contagion. 
 
2.1 Contagion and Multiple Equilibria 
 
The evidence from currency crises in emerging markets during the 1990s suggests an important 
role for contagion across countries, as well as weak fundamentals and exogenous shifts in 
agents’ expectations. From an empirical study of Markov-switching regimes, for example, 
Marcel Fratzscher (2000, 2002) concludes that contagion is the core explanation. In another 
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time-series study by Jung Yeon Kim (2001), it was found that a latent variable measuring 
contagion “plays an important role in causing a series of crises in East Asian emerging markets.” 
 
According to Masson (1999), ‘pure’ contagion involves changes in expectations that are not 
related to changes in a country’s macroeconomic fundamentals. In a context where financial 
markets are subject to self-fulfilling crisis, it may, he suggests, trigger ‘jumps between multiple 
equilibria’. 
 
Fraga and Goldfajn’s (2002) calculation of the sustainable interest rate for Brazil8 suggests a 
critical value of expected default, ecδ , in single figures and explicitly discusses the risk of self-
fulfilling crises if sovereign spreads go significantly higher.  The model specified in previous 
section generates multiple equilibria for Z  in an intermediate range, This implies the existence 
of three rational expectation equilibria, as indicated in Figure 3. The origin, O, where there is no 
Sudden Stop, the no-default equilibrium at the point (b, 0) where, despite the Sudden Stop, taxes 
are high and no default is expected; and default equilibrium at D.9  
 
The effects of contagion can be captured in two ways. First there is the drying up of capital flows 
into the Brazilian bond market which eliminates the first low tax equilibrium. Then there is the 
rise in sovereign spreads as the market calculates the government’s response. Despite the 
difference in fundamentals, both might simply mimic earlier developments in Argentina. 
 
Three arguments in favour of a role for contagion are: first that an event such as Argentine 
default is the type of public signal which could co-ordinate private agents’ expectations on the 
                                                 
8 We compare the rate of interest (r), which is the sum of the default expectation and the risk aversion, with the ecδ , which is the critical value 
of default expectation. We apply the Fraga’s criteria, which is the real interest rate should not exceed GDP growth by more than 7 percentage 
points, in our model. Provided that the potential GDP growth is 4.5 percent, this implies that the real rate of interest should not exceed 12 percent 
(
e
cδ ) for a guarantee of a declining debt to GDP ratio. 
9 The last two equiibria are illustrated in Figure 4, indicating that which is selected depends on private sector beliefs. Clearly when eδ  is less 
than 
e
cδ , the net welfare gain from default must be less than the lump-sum cost of default ( Z ) so there is no default; and the reverse applies 
when 
eδ  exceeds the critical value. 
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bad equilibrium10; second that sovereign spreads have risen generally throughout Latin America 
not just in Brazil, see Figure 1; and third the analogy from East Asia, where a fundamentals-
driven crisis in Thailand in mid-1997 led to a full blown liquidity crisis in Korea the following 
Christmas. Is Argentina to Brazil, what Thailand was to Korea?  
3. Sovereign Spreads and Political Risk 
 
The three leading presidential candidates in the first round of presidential election were Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva, Jose Serra, and Ciro Gomes. Mr. da Silva, a charismatic former trade union 
leader, was the candidate of the Left-wing Workers’ party (PT). Despite the verbal commitments 
by the PT regarding the maintenance of economic stabilisation policies (inflation control, 
contractual obligations, and a primary budget surplus needed to service debt obligations of 3.75 
percent of GDP in 2003), uncertainty over Mr. da Silva’s economic proposals has triggered a 
panic in the country’s financial markets as the markets feared he would use the unilateral 
repudiation as the tool to deal with the debt problems facing Brazil. Mr. Serra was the incumbent 
government’s presidential candidate, the leading proponent of economic continuity, and 
candidate financial markets preferred. Ciro Gomes was the centre-left populist Labour Front’s 
candidate. All three candidates were prevailed upon to endorse IMF fiscal policies as part of the 
arrangements for official financing agreed over the summer.  
 
The pre-election poll results led to a sell-off in the Brazilian bond and currency markets; and, 
from a level of around 7 percent in March, country risk (measured by yield spreads on sovereign 
bonds over U.S. Treasuries) rose to around to 20 percent in August and September (see figure 1). 
After the first round on October 6, in which Lula obtained just under half of the votes, there was 
a run-off between himself and Mr. Serra on October 27 in which Lula obtained a decisive 61 
percent of the votes. Despite the fact he had moderated his anti-capitalist discourse and adopted 
many mainstream economic proposals over the preceding two years, ambiguity over his policies 
continued to generate uncertainty in financial markets at least till the end of the second round; 
and interest rate spreads in October averaged just over 20 percent. In the months that followed, 
                                                 
10
Although Morris and Shin (2000) argued in favour of unique equilibria in a model with private signals, Atkeson (2000) and Boonprakaikawe 
and Ghosal (2000) show how the existence of public signals can generate multiple equilibria 
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spreads narrowed by around 200 basis points per month, dropping to around 13 percent in 
January. 
3.1 A Simple political economy model with no default by the Right-wing 
 
To analyse how political factors can determine sovereign spreads, we modify the model along 
the line of Alesina (1987) by introducing two political parties with different preferences: Left-
wing (L) and Right-wing (R), Thampanishvong (2002). We denote by π  the ex-ante probability 
of the Left-wing party being elected, as indicated by the pre-election polls - for example.11 To 
simplify the analysis, we follow Rodrik and Velasco (1999) by assuming that the Right-wing 
party always repays debt in the face of a Sudden Stop: while the Left-wing party always chooses 
to default and restructure. Conditional on the Sudden Stop, the sequence of events is as follows: 
(1) creditors use the ex-ante probability for each party to be elected to form the expected rate of 
default eδ , (2) the election is held, (3) the elected party chooses whether to default by 
minimising its losses subject to given default expectations. 
With political uncertainty, rational expectations on the part of creditors imply that 
)R()1()L()(Ee δππδδδ −+==     (13) 
where E  denotes the mathematical expectation, )L(δ  and )R(δ  are the ex-post default rates for 
the Left- and Right-wing parties respectively.12 The equilibrium results may be summarised in 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2 Sovereign spreads and political uncertainty 
Let ααα == RL , )b/(bZ
24
L +≤ α  and 
224
R /)b(bZ αα +≥ , then the expected default rate 
is given by ]b)1(/[b 22e παπδ −+=  which is increasing in π . If the Left-wing party is elected, 
the post election outcomes are 0]b)1(/[b 22L >−+= παδ  and b]b)1(/[b 2L <−+= παατ . If 
the Right-wing party is elected, the outcomes are 0R =δ  and 
bbbbR >−++= ])1(/[)(
22 παατ . 
                                                 
11 Ideally, one would explain how these probabilities are determined.  
12 In a more complete model of the political process, this probability would be endogenous as the candidates selected programs to gain votes. 
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Figure 5 illustrates. (The axes are as defined in Figure 4, but here we also use vertical axis to 
represent the mathematical expectation of the default rate). As the Left-wing government always 
defaults and the Right-wing always honours its debts, the corresponding reaction functions 
(conditional on gaining office) are LL and the horizontal axis, respectively. Prior to the election, 
the mathematical expectation of the default rate, )(δE , is a weighted average of these two 
reaction functions, as shown by SS in the figure. The mathematical expectation matches the 
expected rate of default eδ  at point E where SS crosses 45-degree line labelled OR, where the 
rational expectation constraint is satisfied.  After the election, the Left will default as shown at 
LX ; while the Right will choose RX .  
 
L
O
L
R
eδ
δ
S
E
S
)(E δ
LX
RX  
Figure 5: Sovereign spread and political uncertainty. 
 
Consider the situation when the Right-wing party holds power, but an election looms, as in 
Brazil in 2002. Clearly the prospect of the Left-wing being elected will increase sovereign 
spreads even though the current government has no intention of defaulting. This is consistent 
with surges in Brazilian spreads as and when Mr da Silva’s popularity soared. Note that if Lula is 
almost sure to win, there will be little ex-post jump in the spread.13  
                                                 
13 The predicted ex-post jump in sovereign spreads, EXL, will shrink as the pre-election polls swing to left, shifting SS closer to 
LL 
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4. Learning 
 
4.1 Bayesian Updating 
 
The Alesina-style model outlined above assumes that policy preferences of both parties are well 
known. But there was in fact considerable uncertainty about what Lula’s economic policies 
might be. His pre-election speeches indicated substantial Left-wing sentiments: on the other 
hand, he was a signatory to the IMF Letter of Intent promising to deliver substantial primary 
fiscal surpluses and responsible monetary policy. Favero and Giavazzi (2002) suggest that the 
term structure of the pre-election spreads actually showed a peak not at but after the election, 
specifically in early 2003 the date on which Lula was expected to take office. In fact, the 
sovereign spreads have declined steadily since the election. In brief, the public had to learn about 
his policy preferences, particularly his attitude to debt default. As shown in Figure 1, there was a 
marked decline in average spreads in three months after the election, and there was no default. 
Here we employ a model of Bayesian learning to see how avoiding default could lead to 
restoration of confidence and a fall in post-election sovereign spreads.14 This involves extending 
the previous one period model into a multi-period setting.  
 
To incorporate Bayesian learning in an analytically tractable way, we first assume that a Left-
wing party can randomly choose one of the two different preferences (after public has formed its 
default expectations): either a set of preference parameters (low lα  and/or low lZ ) which 
generate default under all circumstances, or a set of preference parameters (high hα  and/or high 
hZ ) which generate no default under all circumstances. The “types” of the Left-wing 
government are differentiated by assigning two different probabilities to these two sets of 
preference parameters.  The Left-wing party can be one of two possible types: either it defaults 
with a high probability, Hρ , in each given period or with a low probability, Lρ , where 
10 <<≤ HL ρρ , cf. Driffill and Miller (1992). Here iρ  ( Hi =  or L ) is the per period 
probability that the Left-wing government would randomly choose a “default” set of preference 
                                                 
14 See Altug et al (2000) for other applications of Bayesian learning that might arise under political and economic 
regimes.  
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parameters to determine the policy outcome, i.e., default while iρ−1  is the complimentary per 
period probability of its choosing a “non-default” set of parameters to determine the policy 
outcome. (We call a Left-wing government with Lρ  a “strong” government and that with Hρ  a 
“weak” government.)  Ex ante (at the beginning of each period), the preferences of the Left-wing 
party can be thought of as the weighted average of extreme values of parameters, (e.g. 
sufficiently low lα  to generate default in all circumstances and sufficiently high hα  so that 
default is avoided), with probability weights of iρ  and iρ−1  (where Hi =  or L ). 
 
Just after the election, the private sector attaches a prior probability 0P to the belief to the 
prospect that the Left-wing government is “strong” (and the complimentary probability of 01 P−  
to the prospect that it is “weak”). How will these priors evolve over time? Let tP  be the private 
sector’s prior belief at time t  that the Left-wing government is strong, conditional on observing 
that the government has not defaulted in the previous t  periods. If there is no default at period t , 
the prior belief of a “strong” government at period 1+t  can be obtained using the Bayesian 
updating rule 
)1)(1()1(
)1(
1
HtLt
Lt
t PP
P
P
ρρ
ρ
−−+−
−
=+       (14) 
The complimentary probability of a “weak” government is 
)1)(1()1(
)1)(1(
1 1
HtLt
Ht
t PP
PP
ρρ
ρ
−−+−
−−
=− + . 
 
Dividing the above two equations yields 
t
t
H
L
t
t
P
P
P
P
−−
−
=
− +
+
11
1
1 1
1
ρ
ρ
.       (15) 
 
Let 
t
t
t P
PV
−
=
1
, then (15) becomes a first-order homogenous difference equation 
t
H
L
t VV ρ
ρ
−
−
=+ 1
1
1 , 
with the solution  
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1 0
0 .        (16) 
Solving for tP  yields 
t
H
L
t
H
L
t
P
P
P
P
P




−
−
−
+





−
−
−
=
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
.       (17) 
 
Consider a simple case where 0=Lρ , i.e., the “strong” Left-wing government never defaults. 
The probability that the government is strong ( tP ) increases monotonically over time. Taking 
limit to (17), one can show that 
1lim =
∞→ tt P . 
As long as the government has not defaulted, the learning will asymptotically reveal the true type 
of the government. 
 
Given that the strong Left-wing government never defaults and that there has been no default up 
to period t , what would be the default expectation at period t ? Under the previous assumptions, 
“strong” and “weak” Left-wing governments, respectively, have the following response 
functions (see (10) and (6)) 
0=Sδ  
and  
)1(2
2
e
t
l
W b
b δ
α
δ +
+
= , 
where Sδ  and Wδ  denote the appropriate default rates. The assumption of rational expectations 
requires 
)1()1(
)1(
])1()[1(])1([)(
2
2
e
t
l
Ht
WHt
SHWHtSLWLttt
e
t
b
bP
P
PPE
δ
α
ρ
δρ
δρδρδρδρδδ
+
+
−=
−=
−+−+−+==
 (18) 
Solving for the expected default rate yields 
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δ        (19) 
Since tP  is increasing over time, 
e
tδ  declines monotonically. 
 
How does post-election learning affect sovereign spreads? Note that the expected default rate 
just after the election of the Left-wing party is given by e0δ . Incorporating politics introduced in 
the previous section, the pre-election expected default rate is given by (see (13)) 
)()1(0 R
ee δππδδ −+= .       (20) 
Assume the Right-wing party never defaults, then the rise in sovereign spreads due to the Left-
wing party being elected is given by 
eee
00 )1( δπδδ −=−  
If the Left-wing party is almost surely to be elected (so π  is close to 1), the sovereign spreads 
would be more or less continuous over the election period. 
 
The qualitative nature of the sovereign spread dynamics is sketched in Figure 6, with time 
measured on the horizontal axis, and 0 indicating the date of the election. Before then, growing 
spreads reflect increasing probability that the left-wing party will be elected. Post election, the 
spreads increase momentarily and then decline over time because of learning (conditional on 
observing no defaults). 
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Figure 6: Sovereign spreads: political uncertainty and learning. 
 
To illustrate the quantitative effect of learning on Brazilian sovereign spreads, we use the 
following numerical example. As the Brazilian external debt to GDP ratio prior to the election 
stood at 40%, we choose 4.0=b . We assume that the “strong” Left-wing government never 
defaults, 0=Lρ , and the “weak” Left-wing government has a high probability of default in each 
month, 4.0=Hρ ; and that the Lula government had very little reputation of being a “strong” 
type just after the election, 2.00 =P . If we choose 3=lα , using (17) and (19), the annualised 
spread just after election will be 21.7%, and the annualised spreads for the next three months are 
given by 18.9%, 15.5% and 12.0%, respectively. The time pattern of the spreads so generated is 
similar to monthly average sovereign spreads for Brazil after the election (given in Figure 1). Of 
course, there may be other factors affecting sovereign spreads in Brazil after the election: this 
example is only for purposes of illustration. 
4.2. Contagion - and ‘learning to forget’ 
In Section 2.1, we discussed how contagion might lead to jumps between equilibria; but the 
political-economy approach with learning provides an alternative channel for contagion. Where 
should the market get its ideas of what a new government in Brazil might do? Why not look at 
what happened in its southern neighbour less than a year before the Brazilian election, where the 
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departure of Argentine President de la Rua led to debt repudiation? The Economist (2003, pp. 
39) takes such a view: “Over the past year, fears of default, stoked by Argentina’s insolvency 
and the past radicalism of Lula and his Workers’ Party (PT), helped push up interest rates and the 
value of the dollar.”   
 
How can this be captured in the model of learning? In the first place, the “high repudiation 
prospect” (ρH in the previous section) could be subject to contagion as it reflects developments 
outside Brazil. Thus, instead of causing a shift between multiple equilibria, contagion can raise 
default expectation by shifting prior beliefs about the nature of an incoming Left-wing 
government. In the second place, with no change in ρH , contagion might reduce the Bayesian 
prior (P0) attach to the prospect that the Left-wing government is strong.  
 
Formally, substituting for e0δ  in (20), we find that default expectations in the political-economy 
model with learning are determined as:   
)()1(0 R
ee δππδδ −+= = )()1())1(( 00 RPP HL δπρρπ −+−+   (21) 
i.e. default expectations are increasing in either of the parameters Hρ  or 0P  subject to 
contagious infection.   
 
Figure 7 describes the equilibrium before the election and the post election forecast. The pre-
election “political equilibrium” shown in the figure is as given in equation (21). In addition, 
along the lines of Alesina (1987), we assume that sovereign debt contracts are signed before the 
election and last about six months, i.e. for some time after the election itself. So, immediately 
after Lula’s victory, the resolution of the election uncertainty will bring a jump in the sovereign 
spreads forecast for January 2003, as indicated in the figure by the jump from the “political 
equilibrium” to the point labelled  ‘market forecast for January’. After Lula takes office and it is 
time to revise short-term debt contracts, however, the equilibrium shifts to the time consistent 
outcome shown as 1D . (Note that this equilibrium is also a forecast, characterised by the 
perceived response function for the Left-wing party labelled ‘market belief of Lula’s type’: with 
learning, it can shift as we discuss below.) The figure is qualitatively consistent with the findings 
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of Favero and Giavazzi (2002) whose analysis suggests that the forecast risk spreads increased 
from the date that the Left-wing party was expected to take office; and rose further thereafter.  
 
eδ
δδ ),(E eδδ =
Market belief of Lula’s
type
)(Mktecδ
 Lula’s True Type
)( laTrueTypeLuecδ
1D
Political
Equilirrium
Increase in Lump-sum cost due to
IMF pre-commitment
Market  forecast for January
S
S
RXO
  
Figure 7:  Pre- and Post-election Default Rates 
 
Would high risk spreads not trigger default by a Left-wing government when it holds power? 
There is a clear danger of this which we believe was avoided by the IMF serving as a pre-
commitment device.  When the IMF approved Brazil’s request for a 15-month stand-by credit of 
approximately US$ 30 billion to support the country’s economic and financial program until 
December 2003, it sought a written commitment from the leading presidential candidates on the 
policies their administrations would follow if they won the election.15 To help stabilise public 
debt dynamics, and lower the debt ratio over the medium term, the commitment included a target 
for a public sector primary surplus of 3.75 percent of GDP in 2003, and no less than this for 
2004-2005. (The Lula government has in fact raised the target to 4.25 percent, further reassuring 
overseas investors, Financial Times (2003), p. 22 , March 31) 
 
                                                 
15 “IMF Approves US$30.4 Billion Stand-By Credit for Brazil,” International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 
02/40, September 6, 2002. 
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Just as bad news from Argentina could increase sovereign spreads in the political-economy 
model discussed above, so arrangements with the IMF might have the opposite effect. By 
supplying funds before the election in exchange for these commitments, the IMF could help 
counter contagion. Notably, such declarations might significantly increase the actual and 
perceived lump-sum cost of default for the Left-wing government, i.e. increase lZ  in equation 
(2). In addition, by signing a Letter of Declaration, for example, an incoming Left-wing party 
might effectively reduce extreme views of its potential behaviour (so increasing P0 and reducing 
Hρ ).  
 
In the absence of learning, point 1D indicates the market forecast at the time of election for “time 
consistent sovereign spreads” with Lula as President. Note that if 1D is indeed the equilibrium, 
Lula would be forced to default despite the IMF pre-commitment. Because of learning, however, 
this bad equilibrium may be avoided. On the assumption that after the election, the market 
“learns to forget” the precedent of Argentina and learns to trust Lula.  
 
The learning effects on sovereign spreads are illustrated in Figure 8. Assuming that Lula has 
“strong” preferences against default, the response function of the Left-wing will shift downward 
as the market updates its belief, and raises its estimate of the preference parameter lα .  Higher 
lα  lowers the intercept and the slope of the response function. These trace out the downward 
movement of the equilibria, initially from the point JanD  (13 percent) and to MarchD  (11 percent).  
 
At the same time, there will also be the learning of the fixed cost of the Left-wing government. 
Both the higher fixed cost ( lZ ) and higher lα  increase the critical level of expected default rate 
of the Left-wing government. As seen from the figure, the learning process will cause the step 
response function to shrink from left to right. At a certain point, the step function will just touch 
the 45-degree line and leave it thereafter. This implies a sudden, discontinuous jump of spreads 
to their steady state level.16 According to Favero and Giavazzi (2002), the long-run risk spreads 
might be around 4 percent. 
                                                 
16 In this simple model, spreads would fall to zero. Incorporating non-political uncertainty will generate positive 
steady state spreads. 
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Figure 8: Learning to Forget 
 
 
Things may, in practice, be more complicated as the government seeks to “manage 
expectations”. As The Economist (January, 2003) remarked: “Since the final weeks of the 
election campaign, Lula has worked hard to turn investor panic into mere wariness. He has 
stressed that Brazil means to pay its debt and has chosen ministers who seem ready to carry that 
promise through.” (The Economist page 39, January 4, 2003). He has moreover increased the 
target for the primary fiscal surplus to 4.25 percent of GDP, i.e. raised it by half a percent above 
what was promised to the IMF (Financial Times, 2003). This suggests how the learning model 
could be improved: namely by incorporating strategic behaviour on the part of the new president 
aimed at reassuring the market that he is not as radical as might have been feared. So, instead of 
Bayesian updating, beliefs could be subject to manipulation by the new government. 17   
                                                 
17 Models of strategic learning that may be useful in this context include Cripps (1991), Ellison and Valla (2001) and 
Rosal and Spagat (2003) 
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If President da Silva wanted to give reassurance, dismissing the incumbent Central Bank 
Governor, Arminio Fraga, was surely a risky thing to do.18 Should one also model the learning-
curve of the incoming government as it develops the skill of managing market sentiment?  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Williamson (2002) examined Brazilian fundamentals and politics and concluded that markets 
panicked. Like the bank panic in Korea, this might represent a shift of equilibrium triggered by 
contagion from a neighbouring crisis.  It may, on the other hand, reflect “political equilibrium” in 
a context where, for the first time, a charismatic Left-wing leader is running strongly for office. 
For reasons suggested by Alesina, sovereign spreads will then tend to move in line with opinion 
polls, rising with the popularity of Left-wing president as shown in Figure 1 and 2. In the context 
where the behaviour of the potential Left-wing president is very uncertain, there may also have 
been contagion as markets and masses unthinkingly transposed events from neighbouring 
Argentina to Brazil. It appears that the IMF can play an important role in combating this 
contagion. Perceptions of radical repudiation may fade as candidates of all parties publicly 
promise to control fiscal deficits and abide by existing debt contracts, signing a Letter of 
Declaration to the IMF as a form of pre-commitment. As models of Bayesian learning suggest, 
however, prior probabilities of a radical repudiation will be revised over time if debts are 
honoured and repudiation resisted. This is, we believe, taking place in Brazil; and if continued it 
offers the prospect of real interest rates falling sufficiently to allow for continued growth without 
default. 
 
Allowing for strategic learning, where the incoming government actively tries to manage public 
perceptions and allay market fears, would doubtless provide a more comprehensive and realistic 
understanding of events.  
 
                                                 
18 It should be added that the new appointee as governor is likely to retain many of Fraga’s advisers; and the new Finance 
Minister is reputed to have plans to make the central bank more independent of the government,-- as did the British Chancellor 
when the Labour Party first took office under Tony Blair. 
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